Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 14:17:27 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: carnil@...ian.org Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE Request: Gtk2 Perl Module: incorrect memory management in Gtk2::Gdk::Display::list_devices -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > A new upstream version of the Gtk2 Perl module was released (1.2495) > fixing incorrect memory management in > Gtk2::Gdk::Display::list_devices. Upstream commit is at > > https://git.gnome.org/browse/perl-Gtk2/commit/?id=4856da628ce37099b27b66a88141dc6daad693b0 > > References: > ----------- > - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1188219 > - https://mail.gnome.org/archives/gtk-perl-list/2015-January/msg00039.html > - https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15173 > - https://lwn.net/Vulnerabilities/633094/ In this situation, we didn't immediately reach a conclusion about how to incorporate the perspective of the upstream vendor. Specifically, https://mail.gnome.org/archives/gtk-perl-list/2015-January/msg00042.html says 'Do you really need such an "official" and elaborate effort for this kind of bug fix? These kinds of fixes are done all over the place all the time without special announcements.' The upstream fix removes a "g_list_free (devices);" with a comment of "Fix incorrect memory management in Gtk2::Gdk::Display::list_devices ... We do not own the returned list." https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15173#c3 says "Did not find any PoC." Maybe the initial question is "do all changes of this type, in all products, always qualify for a CVE ID?" If, for example, the upstream vendor meant that "all over the place all the time" fixes are exclusively "fixes for issues that are known to be non-exploitable, not even for a crash," then we think there probably should not be a CVE ID. If nobody has any definitive information about an impact, then the answer is much less clear. Before assigning a CVE ID, we might (or might not) want to require further information, such as how is "devices" used after the g_list_free. A recent academic paper that tries to further categorize related issues is: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~blee303/paper/dangnull.pdf The timeline seems to be: 1. An incorrect g_list_free was found. There's perhaps no information about how it was found. It might, for example, have been found through an automated testing approach that has the potential of discovering thousands of similar code problems. 2. The fix was mentioned in an upstream announcement of a new release. 3. One or more persons in the Linux vendor community noticed the new release (possibly because of automated checking for new upstream releases). 4. Because the type of code problem is one that is sometimes (one may argue "frequently") exploitable, multiple Linux vendors distributed a fix. 5. There doesn't seem to be a reference indicating that any analysis of impact was done, or that otherwise tries to establish that this specific code issue is best categorized as a vulnerability. 6. Still, there is interest in a CVE ID because Linux vendors often have a CVE mapping associated with a code change of this type. It's unclear to us exactly what should happen here. Should we be using a "per release" attribute as one aspect of deciding whether a CVE ID is needed? (Specifically, because this one code change was apparently the primary motivation for releasing 1.2495, does that increase the importance of having a CVE ID?) Is it sufficient that everybody agrees the code was wrong and that nobody has ruled out exploitability? If someone happens to enumerate the complete set of the "all over the place all the time" fixes that the upstream vendor mentioned, do they all need CVE IDs as well? - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVAdeZAAoJEKllVAevmvmsjyQIAKlLxx+HppJjgtlQSYIIpugq rq+2HnNFsdMBzA6THF33tX8gUxXH7B3q7inZxdVFmGeqX0mYfw6pjZD77gYXFXP1 dpra/sVxZF5HoQBFdoYDxbNn2RA2pNwSe4oxc9z3NivCQwEcpRYdUHVeLtBKCqrN kEjagGcb7rlDC/2uegNlbRdqbXbWUYfXQf4EW4GTci6jvzzifFw38IYLyQ+UO00S LtHd5kZfdJ5PZiC+PITsNYcjM3am41mJwggrHChOwzhN0+Dx1LsH0kUlrTBlCZBE vX8SHiIwZK0xoiF2lbPTZYhctWNbf8hS03/k0uCIgRbUbhBQ2xc92DwXj9S9jls= =uC8N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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