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Date: Tue,  3 Mar 2015 20:08:28 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: gmc@...library.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request - Evergreen

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> http://evergreen-ils.org/security-releases-evergreen-2-7-4-2-6-7-and-2-5-9/

We have these initial questions, in part to determine whether there should
be a total of two CVE IDs or three CVE IDs.

http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/03/03/11 says:

> Both bugs had permitted remote unauthenticated access of confidential
> application configuration settings.

but https://bugs.launchpad.net/evergreen/+bug/1206589 says:

> Any user who can authenticate to Evergreen and make the proper
> open-ils.pcrud calls can view the history of any setting ... once
> anonymous pcrud goes in, no login would be required either.

Was there a released version of Evergreen in which an unauthenticated
attacker could view a setting's history by exploiting this bug?

https://bugs.launchpad.net/evergreen/+bug/1206589 also says:

> An immediate fix for this would be to add a permission, just about any
> permission that a patron would not have ... The
> collab/dyrcona/lp1206589-quick-fix branch in the security repo adds a
> retrieve permission of STAFF_LOGIN ... That leaves us pretty much
> where the initial bug reports assumes we were with settings exposed
> only to unauthorized staff ... Since I have suggested removing the
> open-ils.pcrud controller, leaving cstore as the only mode of access
> to these settings, new API calls would need to be added to search and
> retrieve the settings history.

and
http://git.evergreen-ils.org/?p=Evergreen.git;a=commit;h=ac588e879cf73ff1b65617e0bd273361d3529063
says:

> Temporary Fix for Org. Unit Settings History Bug
     
>  1. It adds a retrieve permission of STAFF_LOGIN.  This at least
> requires someone with staff permission to be able to view settings
> history.

Does this mean that:

 - in version 2.7.3, there is a major vulnerability in which a
   setting's history can be viewed by any authenticated user,
   including users with the "patron" role

 - in version 2.7.4, there is a minor vulnerability in which a
   setting's history can be viewed by all persons with the staff role,
   which would include unauthorized staff in many realistic
   deployments. This might be fixed in a future release by forcing all
   access to use cstore, or by some other undetermined change.

?

> https://bugs.launchpad.net/evergreen/+bug/1424755

This seems to be a much simpler case that was completely fixed by
http://git.evergreen-ils.org/?p=Evergreen.git;a=commit;h=3a0f1cc7b2efa517ee4cd4c6a682237554fed307
and had allowed unauthenticated access. It will have only one CVE ID.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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