Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 13:35:43 +0100 From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE-request: systemd-resolved DNS cache poisoning On 11/12/2014 12:15 PM, Sebastian Krahmer wrote: > At its simplest, an attacker triggers a query to a domain he controls > via SMTP or SSH-login. Upon receipt of the question, he can just add > any answer he wants to have cached to the legit answer he provides > for the query, e.g. providing two anser RR's: One for the question asked > and one for a question that has never been asked - even if the DNS server > is not authoritative for this domain. BIND 9 is supposed to filter such garbage from upstream answers, but there are other resolvers out there which will pass through such answers unchanged, so this is very much CVE-worthy. (This systemd component is optional, I strongly recommend not to ship it. It's not even possible right now to dump the cache contents to debug such issues.) -- Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
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