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Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 09:21:38 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: ejabberd compression allows
 cirucumvention of encryption despite starttls_required

Am Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:39:48 +1100
schrieb Michael Samuel <mik@...net.net>:

> On 14 October 2014 00:09, Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de> wrote:
> > I think this deserves a CVE:
> > http://mail.jabber.org/pipermail/operators/2014-October/002438.html
> 
> If a client is willing to do that, then an attacker can simply force
> downgrade the client and connect to the server using TLS. (Assuming
> client certificates aren't in use)

Basically these things often work under a more or less
"trust-on-first-use"-assumption.

E.g. the client will check the server config on the first connection
and use that settings in the future.

So there is a scenario where this leads to unintended unencrypted
connections.

-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

mail/jabber: hanno@...eck.de
GPG: BBB51E42

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