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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 23:58:24 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: openssh on linux rce in sftp-only mode
On Wed, Oct 08, 2014 at 03:32:23PM -0400, Josh Bressers wrote:
> >
> > I reported this to the OpenSSH developers, and although they included my
> > patch as a mitigation, they did not treat it as a vuln in OpenSSH.
> >
> > I believe that treating this as a hardening patch makes sense. The SFTP
> > server behaves exactly as documented, it allows access to the whole
> > filesystem. And on Linux, that happens to equal write access to the
> > process RAM, so you should never give that access to someone who
> > shouldn't be able to run arbitrary code.
> >
>
> I think one has to assume if a user has unrestricted sftp access, they can
> figure out how to do most anything. Even with the upstream hardening patch,
> it really only protects the sftpd process. Any other processes the user may
> own could be modified.
Not that easily - /proc/$pid/mem requires you to either be the same process
or be attached to it via ptrace, I think.
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