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Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 11:35:41 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: chet.ramey@...e.edu
Subject: Re: Shellshocker - Repository of "Shellshock" Proof of Concept Code

On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 06:46:22AM +0000, mancha wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 07, 2014 at 09:51:50AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> > Shellshock is actually an example of "selective disclosure" (as Ted
> > Unangst calls it) arguably not working well enough to be worthwhile.
> > In this case, it was because the right ones (as it turned out) of the
> > "many eyeballs" - Tavis and Michal - were not party to the "selective
> > disclosure".  Florian was, but I am guessing that without finding more
> > parser bugs convincing Chet and distros to remove exposure of the
> > parser so urgently would have been difficult.  Arguably, this suggests
> > that we should expand the distros list membership with security
> > researchers who are capable, willing, and have (paid?) time to review
> > upcoming security patches and the software being patched for possible
> > other flaws closely related to those being patched.
> 
> I've been thinking about this for the past week and agree with your
> problem identification. However, the lesson I rescue is diametrically
> opposed to the one you arrived at.

I am not saying I arrived at the above lesson.  Notice the word
"arguably".  No change to distros list membership is being proposed.

Also, you're quoting only part of the context.  More context for Chet:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/10/07/7

I also mention the "diametrically opposed" reasoning in the very posting
you replied to.

> I don't know how long the initial report was embargo'd

Why, here's the timeline:

http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/shellshock.html#timeline

> but I'm pretty
> sure the process became infinitely more productive after the veil of
> semi-secrecy was lifted (be it in metrics like LoC/hour or reports/day).

Of course.

> It's amazing how productive people can be when incentives are properly
> aligned.

Unfortunately, those same people were also less productive than usual at
their other duties (including security-related) during this time period.

> Your solution is to add Tavis and Michal to distros@.

No, it is not "my solution".

> What about the
> next flaw when the two researchers who turn out to be key are Bob and
> Fred? Add them next? You'll be playing catch-up.

I hope this concern is well understood by all of us.

That said, Tavis actually was on the old vendor-sec, and I think it's
not a mere coincidence.  I just had to ask myself a "what if" question:
what if I kept the original vendor-sec membership intact, including the
security researchers?  So I did consider this question now, in public.

Perhaps more importantly, it wouldn't necessarily have taken a specific
lucky person to find and insist that the parser needed to be removed
from exposure, nor to find any additional parser bug.  All it would have
taken is someone capable actually tasked with reviewing the related
functionality in bash for potential further issues.  So maybe having
this responsibility assigned to some particular people would be of help.
Not a complete solution indeed, but it might work better than what we
have now.  I am just thinking aloud here.

> I think the overarching lesson here is there are costs to the embargo
> paradigm some have grown to love and over-use. Few consider the negative
> effects that removing one aspect of "open" from open source can have and
> how energetic the process can become once it's reintroduced.

I think I brought up the same concerns in the message you replied to.

It sounds like it's obvious to you that we've seen a case of "over-use"
of embargo and that "few" people "consider the negative effects".

Like I wrote in the previous message, and putting it into different
words now, I find that it is possible that embargo was over-used in this
case, but this is far from obvious to me.  I notice both negative and
positive effects that it had.  The fast-paced post-initial-disclosure
patching of further issues would likely not have been as fast without
upstream and distros having already started working together under the
embargo.  For example, for some distros, it is quicker to merge another
patch and rebuild a package when the same package has already been
updated just days ago, and with a patch in a similar area, than when it
hasn't been updated in months or years (especially for old yet still
maintained branches of the distro).

I think many people consider negative effects of embargoes, and my
message was aimed at those aspects too.

Whenever I am asked for advice on whether to report an issue to the
distros list (not often, but there were a few occasions where people
asked me first), I usually direct the reporter to post to oss-security
right away instead.  I host the distros list primarily because embargoes
exist anyway, like e.g. in the Shellshock case the issue was being
handled under an embargo for 10 days before it reached distros (for 2
days more).  I think the distros list role in this was mildly positive.

Alexander

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