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Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 10:33:20 -0400
From: Chet Ramey <chet.ramey@...e.edu>
To: Osmond Sun <osmond.sun@...il.com>, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: chet.ramey@...e.edu
Subject: Re: Re: CVE-2014-6271: remote code execution through
bash (3rd vulnerability)
On 9/29/14, 9:01 AM, Osmond Sun wrote:
> I found the function parsing is still imperfect.
> e.g. $env x="() { :;}; `touch vulnerablefile`" bash -c "echo this is a test "
If that is the command you ran, this doesn't show any vulnerability. The
double quotes surrounding the assignment to x in the argument to `env'
mean that command substitution is performed before env runs. It's the
command substitution that creates the file, so the file exists before bash
is invoked.
Chet
--
``The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne.'' - Chaucer
``Ars longa, vita brevis'' - Hippocrates
Chet Ramey, ITS, CWRU chet@...e.edu http://cnswww.cns.cwru.edu/~chet/
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