Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 23:47:05 +0200 From: Nicolas RUFF <nicolas.ruff@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Multiple issues in libVNCserver Hello list, I am currently reviewing libVNCserver for potential security issues. Project home is: https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver Here are my findings so far. Found bugs are either client- or server-side (libVNCserver provides both). All bugs require authentication. However they still pose a significant issue in the following scenarios: * VNC server is running in password-less mode because authentication is required afterwards (e.g. X11 login screen). * Attacker is located in a man-in-the-middle position. * Attacker has legitimate access to the VNC server but possibly not to the host server (e.g. virtual machine, remote assistance to a customer). Fixes are being committed - a few of them are still pending in the pull request. CVE-2014-6051 Integer overflow in MallocFrameBuffer() on client side. A malicious VNC server could advertise a very large screen size (by RFB protocol, width and height are 16-bit integers), resulting in an integer overflow during malloc() on client-side. Heap corruption, and possibly remote code execution on client-side could ensue. CVE-2014-6052 Lack of malloc() return value checking on client side. malloc() return value was not checked on client-side during framebuffer setup. A malicious VNC server that advertises a large enough screen size to make malloc() fail could basically map the framebuffer at address 0, and write anything-anywhere in client process memory using selective FramebufferUpdate messages. This could certainly turn into remote code execution on client-side. CVE-2014-6053 Server crash on a very large ClientCutText message. A malicious client could advertise a very large ClientCutText message size (by RFB protocol, size is encoded on a 32-bit integer). malloc() is likely to fail in that case; as malloc() return value is not checked, this will most likely result in a server crash. Note: this issue also affects RealVNC as per CVE-2010-5304. http://www.iss.net/security_center/reference/vuln/VNC_Client_Cut_Text_DoS.htm http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/89160/RealVNC-VNC-Server-Free-Edition-4.1.3-Denial-Of-Service.html CVE-2014-6054 Server crash when scaling factor is set to zero. A malicious client could set the scaling factor to 0, which will result in a server crash (division by zero). CVE-2014-6055 Multiple stack overflows in File Transfer feature. 1/ The non-standard file transfer messages (UltraVNC feature) will blindly strcpy() client-provided file and directory names into a stack-based buffer of size MAX_PATH, resulting in multiple stack-based buffer overflows on server-side. 2/ Client-supplied FileTime attribute is copied into a stack-based buffer of size 64 during rfbFileTransferOffer message parsing, resulting in a stack-based buffer overflow on server-side. Regards, - Nicolas RUFF
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