Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 18:33:38 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, cve-assign@...re.org Subject: CVE's for intersection vulnerabilities -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 So long story short: we have a program called sosreport that is used to send system information back to Red Hat so we can help customers troubleshoot their problems. It would appear we have three main classes of (potential) security vulnerabilities: 1) sosreport collects sensitive information that is unexpected/should not be included, e.g. potentially it could grab configuration files with credentials for third party systems/etc. My take on this is this type of data should only be included if explicitly added/requested by the end user (it should default to safe for well known sensitive files in other words). 2) sosreport collects sensitive information that would be "normal", e.g. HTTP logs with GET requests, or usernames used to log into services. My take on this is that we should document this behaviour and provide options for the users to review/sanitize data prior to it being sent to Red Hat, but that this is security hardening and not a vulnerability, so no CVE. 3) sosreport unintentionally collects sensitive information, e.g. a service mistakenly logs username/password to a world readable log file, which sosreport then includes. My take on this would be that a CVE is deserved for the program logging the sensitive information (which normally it would get in any event), but that no CVE should be assigned for sosreport (since #1 the flaw isn't in sosreport, and ideally with #2 the user sees it and sanitizes it any ways). But then we have #4: 4) sosreport unintentionally collects sensitive information, e.g. a service mistakenly logs username/password to a secured log file. Now normally this would not get a CVE since the logfile has secure permissions, however we have a situation where sosreport is potentially exposing the information. So do we assign a CVE for this intersection vulnerability? - -- Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJTybziAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmT/ugQAI1JZ4ytuOT2kAlAdAkAFIb2 Cggz2KKkS+KKJDwc4hTN8SR1BBlNQGimc7CUPSoex4UnBxk8MBfXjYX+6NEkxVav OSJNm5UKkNgj4f/8Eagqvjhr5SDnBX2upYb4FzmyViF/kUw4mihJnhADE9MdJpHp 0RLMBgQnkUrpB/wQu4ESPzZGf7MdoB3+3vRLQ2viYMT3MY3kf9iusYA4YNvXzaMo fcT6yV/fJDVqjEem7yGGJKOzSgPf5IrY25iNtMS1LiEn0PgDBeVV7gG77ee2vWEP 2G3naLZwVQNTVpNJk2ahdI9TV4quv5Sv65F/xYYzesZQccd/ZRMAMLgn0KgP9WHz eUjb1dNyQPK3AYJAhbdUr1H+AWrJSQ45IVoIUYdFTHoEGfogmvg4pvXtAi7gugK4 m/2MUYkw6sl2F4SuwQJeSbeLe/zDpR4ThXuhoghQ2kazsKWsOYZ918qeR3gUFKQF g8p3dbknBDao7yBg+1UPqJskgAGnGYQsbC0fqPwRSAtyodpaHrxQSqOPrpwkNcTx vMly1vH8mLg+qbhds+CdvWD/0/cj+pWg69l3Z2AbYQW6GvwIIYXRxgsqOk75wPqt xdY67JuxA01IhOCavwc1sNfeWssLJZzN6YTb+NwwTjqLx4SXDVyiF1NHczPn+F1t iF1QKZLIimXfxBcceBxN =PIbq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ