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Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 15:02:02 +0530 (IST)
From: P J P <ppandit@...hat.com>
To: oss security list <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: LMS-2014-06-16-5: Linux Kernel LZ4

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   Hi,

+-- On Fri, 27 Jun 2014, Eddie Chapman wrote --+
| I think it's worth pointing out that the Linux kernel only introduced LZ4 
| support in 3.11. This is why from the new kernel.org stable releases 
| yesterday, only 3.14.9 and 3.15.2 contain the LZ4 patch. 3.10.45 and 3.4.95 
| don't.

  It's been discussed in the other thread, yet just for the record, a reply 
from the upstream author:

+-- On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 Yann Collet wrote --+
|Hi Prasad
|
|Nope, latest lz4 release is not affected.
|
|
|Moreover, even the linux kernel implementation is safe, for now. To trigger 
|the risk, the program calling the lz4 linux kernel implementation must feed 
|the decoder with blocks of more than 8 MB. None of them is doing that right 
|now, so it's not exploitable.
|
|However, it's true that, in the future, maybe one program may wander into  
|this area. So it's a good thing to update the LZ4 implementation today, 
|before the risk get potentially exposed by a yet unknown future program.
|
|
|I feel this version of the story should be more widely answered. The current  
|risk has been overblown. If you have some way to answer to the sec-list 
|article you linked to, could you please make it known ? In the meantime, I'm 
|in contact with Greg k-h, to make sure the linux kernel implementation will 
|get fixed for the next Linux release.
|
|Best regards
|

Thank you.
- --
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
47AF CE69 3A90 54AA 9045 1053 DD13 3D32 FE5B 041F

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