Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 12:44:34 -0600 From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen@...hat.com> To: "OSS Security List" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: CVE request: multiple /tmp races in ppc64-diag Just quoting from our bug report: As noted in the SUSE bug report, numerous /tmp race conditions exist in ppc64-diag, in particular: rtas_errd/diag_support.c:233: char command="/usr/bin/find /proc/device-tree -name status -print > /tmp/get_dt_files"; rtas_errd/diag_support.c:241: fp1 = fopen("/tmp/get_dt_files", "r"); rtas_errd/prrn_hotplug:8:TMPFILE=`mktemp -p /tmp` scripts/ppc64_diag_mkrsrc:126:mkdir "/tmp/diagSEsnap", 0775; scripts/ppc64_diag_mkrsrc:127:$general_eed_file = "/tmp/diagSEsnap/snapH.tar.gz"; In the case of rtas_errd/prrn_hotplug, mktemp is used but is assumed to have succeeded; there is no check for the return value. mktemp should probably be used properly in all of these. I don't know if the data in /tmp/diagSEsnap is sensitive or not, but if it is, the permissions on that directory should probably be tightened up. I think a single CVE should suffice for this. The above is from ppc64-diag-2.6.1. Thanks. References: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=882667 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1109371 -- Vincent Danen / Red Hat Product Security [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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