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Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 15:12:35 +1200
From: Matthew Daley <mattd@...fuzz.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE requests / advisory: TeamPass <= 2.1.19

Hi,

I'd like to request CVE IDs for these issues. They were found in
TeamPass (www.teampass.net), an open-source collaborative password
manager.

This is the first such request and the issues are now public; this
message serves as an advisory as well.

All the issues are found in TeamPass versions <= 2.1.19, and all were
reported by myself. The fixes are in the project's 2.1.20 git branch
and not master (which is where users are directed to download the
project from on the project's homepage.)


Issue #1: File execution protection bypass via language path injection

Numerous TeamPass PHP files check for the existence and the setting of
a $_SESSION value, "CPM", in order to prevent them from being
requested by users and executed directly without going through
index.php as actually intended.

However, index.php (and sources/main.queries.php with the
"change_user_language" request) allows users to set their language by
passing it in via a POST variable. It is not checked for validity;
FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING is not sufficient. A user can set their
language so that the attempt by index.php to require_once a language
file actually leads to loading one of the aforementioned
execution-protected files. At this point, index.php has already set
the CPM session variable and hence the protection is bypassed.

For example, using this vulnerability, an unauthenticated user can
cause the administrator settings page to be rendered. They can then
change any admin settings as if they were logged in as the
administrator. Interesting settings to change include: the ldap
settings, so as to point to an attacker-controlled LDAP server to
allow login to the TeamPass instance; the custom login text, which is
shown unescaped at the login prompt, for a stored-XSS attack to
retrieve users' credentials; or the filesystem path settings, to
divert execution to other locations.

This issue is exploitable by remote unauthenticated users with a wide
impact depending on the pages/settings accessed (login bypass, remote
code execution (see example in next issue), ...).

Fix: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/fd549b245c0f639a8d47bf4f74f92c37c053706f


Issue #2: File execution protection bypass via incorrect use of
session variables

This relates to the same $_SESSION-based "CPM" checks that certain
files make in order to prevent their direct execution by users.

There is another bypass; it is simpler but allows the execution of
slightly fewer execution-protected files.

index.php sets the session CPM variable to 1 at the start of its
execution. Hence, by simply requesting index.php, a user is able to
then directly execute some of the other execution-protected files. The
files affected are limited to the ones that call session_start before
checking the CPM protection key. If they do not, then the CPM key is
obviously unset and hence the protection still works correctly.

For example:
$ curl -b /tmp/cookies -c /tmp/cookies
'http://192.168.1.73/TeamPass/sources/upload/upload.files.php?PHPSESSID=';
echo
Hacking attempt...
$ curl -b /tmp/cookies -c /tmp/cookies
'http://192.168.1.73/TeamPass/index.php' &> /dev/null
$ curl -b /tmp/cookies -c /tmp/cookies
'http://192.168.1.73/TeamPass/sources/upload/upload.files.php?PHPSESSID=';
echo
{"jsonrpc" : "2.0", "result" : null, "id" : "id"}

Observe that after requesting index.php, we have access to TeamPass's
file upload facility, obviously a sensitive component. I have tested
that file upload is indeed possible this way.

This issue is exploitable by remote unauthenticated users and
similarly has a wide impact depending on the pages/settings accessed
(login bypass, remote code execution...).

Fix: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/7715512f2bd5659cc69e063a1c513c19e384340f


Issue #3: Multiple SQL injection vectors in sources/main.queries.php

There are two SQL injection vectors in this file.

The first is in the handling of the "send_pw_by_email" request, namely
in the "login" POST variable. This is interpolated, unescaped, in the
SQL query that checks whether there is already a password reset
request key in the database.

The second is in the handling of the "generate_new_password" request,
namely in the "login" POST variable again. This is interpolated,
unescaped, in the SQL query that retrieves the password reset request
key from the database.

These vectors are accessible by remote unauthenticated users by
exploiting the first two issues, or to authenticated users directly. I
have tested each unique type of injection with sqlmap and have
confirmed that they allow the complete dump of the database,
modification of its data, remote SQL/OS shell execution, etc.

Fix: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/7715512f2bd5659cc69e063a1c513c19e384340f


Issue #4: Multiple SQL injection vectors in sources/datatable/*; and
datatable.logs.php (in the root directory, *not* in sources/datatable
directory)

There are numerous copy-pasted SQL injections in each of these files.
I'll describe the common element of each instead of splitting them
across each of the five files.

The first and second are in the "iDisplayStart" and "iDisplayLength"
GET variables. These are used to build a SQL query LIMIT fragment.
They are interpolated, unescaped, into this fragment.

These are repeated per-action in each of the five files, giving rise
to a total of 2 * (1 + 6 + 1 + 1 + 5) = 28 SQL injection vectors.

The third is in the "sSortDir_..." GET variable(s). This *is*
mysql_real_escape_string'd before interpolation into a SQL query ORDER
BY fragment, but it is not surrounded by apostrophes in the fragment.
It is therefore still open to exploitation by using injections that do
not involve any characters that are escaped.

These are repeated per-action in each of the five files, giving rise
to a total of 1 * (1 + 6 + 1 + 1 + 5) = 14 SQL injection vectors.

These vectors are accessible by remote unauthenticated users by
exploiting the first two issues, or to authenticated users directly. I
have tested each unique type of injection with sqlmap and have
confirmed that they allow the complete dump of the database,
modification of its data, remote SQL/OS shell execution, etc.

Fix: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/7715512f2bd5659cc69e063a1c513c19e384340f
and https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/8820c8934d9ba0508ac345e73ad0be29049ec6de


Issue #5: Multiple XSS vectors in items.php

There are four locations where user-provided input is echoed back into
the generated page without escaping in this file:

- Three locations with the "group" GET parameter when outputting the
"hid_cat" and "open_folder" form input HTML elements
- One location with the "id" GET parameter when outputting the
"open_id" form input HTML element.

A remote unauthenticated attacker can, with limited victim input,
navigate a logged-in TeamPass user with a crafted URL and perform an
XSS attack, allowing ie. the exfiltration of the user's cookies so as
to allow the attacker to authenticate as the victim.

Fix: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/fd549b245c0f639a8d47bf4f74f92c37c053706f
and https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/commit/8820c8934d9ba0508ac345e73ad0be29049ec6de


Please let me know if you need any further information.

Thanks,

- Matthew Daley

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