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Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 13:16:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: security@....org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 95 - input handling vulnerabilities loading guest kernel on ARM
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> Xen Security Advisory XSA-95
We would like to model this one as having four distinct primary issues.
In other words, although the concepts of missing validation are
similar, and the impacts may be the same, the types of validation can
be categorized separately. Thus, there are four CVE IDs.
> When loading a 32-bit ARM guest kernel the Xen tools did not correctly
> validate the length of the kernel against the actual image size. This
> would then lead to an overrun on the input buffer when loading the
> kernel into guest RAM.
Use CVE-2014-3714.
> Furthermore when checking a 32-bit guest kernel for an appended DTB,
> the Xen tools were prone to additional overruns also leading to an
> overrun on the input buffer when loading the kernel into guest RAM.
Use CVE-2014-3715.
> Also, the tools would access a field in the putative DTB header
> without checking for its alignment.
Use CVE-2014-3716.
> When loading a 64-bit ARM guest kernel the tools similarly did not
> fully validate the requested load addresses, possibly leading to an
> overrun on the input buffer when loading the kernel into guest RAM.
Use CVE-2014-3717.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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