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Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 23:15:19 +0800 (WST)
From: David Adam <zanchey@....gu.uwa.edu.au>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
cc: Bartlomiej Piotrowski <b@...otrowski.pl>, kov@...ian.org, luto@....edu, 
    nemysis@...eBSD.org, ridiculous_fish <corydoras@...iculousfish.com>
Subject: Re: Upcoming security release of fish 2.1.1

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Whoops - missed a spot.

There is also a symlink attack that doesn't depend on a race condition, so we'll
include a patch for that as well.

Could we have an additional CVE-ID assigned, please?

Thanks,

David Adam
fish committer
zanchey@....gu.uwa.edu.au
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On Mon, 28 Apr 2014, David Adam wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> fish (the friendly interactive shell) is a smart and user-friendly command
> line shell for OS X, Linux, and the rest of the family.
> 
> fish 2.1.1 will be released shortly, correcting two security vulnerabilities
> and reducing the scope of a further security vulnerability.
> 
> fish 2.1.1 will be made available as source and binary packages at
> http://fishshell.com/.
> 
> The following security vulnerabilities have been identified in the fish shell:
> 
> CVE-2014-2905: fish universal variable socket vulnerable to permission bypass
> leading to privilege escalation
> 
>   fish, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), does not
>   check the credentials of processes communicating over the fishd universal
>   variable server UNIX domain socket. This allows a local attacker to elevate
>   their privileges to those of a target user running fish, including root.
> 
>   fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable.
> 
>   No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish.
> 
>   https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1436
> 
> CVE-2014-2906: fish temporary file creation vulnerable to race condition
> leading to privilege escalation
> 
>   fish, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), creates
>   temporary files in an insecure manner.
> 
>   Versions 1.23.0 to 2.1.0 (inclusive) execute code from these temporary files,
>   allowing privilege escalation to those of any user running fish, including
>   root.
> 
>   Additionally, from at least version 1.16.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive),
>   fish will read data using the psub function from these temporary files,
>   meaning that the input of commands used with the psub function is under the
>   control of the attacker.
> 
>   fish version 2.1.1 is not vulnerable.
> 
>   No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish.
> 
>   https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1437
> 
> CVE-2014-2914: fish web interface does not restrict access leading to remote
> code execution
> 
>   fish, from version 2.0.0 to version 2.1.0 (inclusive), fails to restrict
>   connections to the Web-based configuration service (fish_config). This
>   allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user
>   running fish_config.
> 
>   The service is generally only running for short periods of time.
> 
>   fish version 2.1.1 restricts incoming connections to localhost only. At this
>   stage, users should avoid running fish_config on systems where there are
>   untrusted local users, as they are still able to connect to the fish_config
>   service and elevate their privileges to those of the user running
>   fish_config.
> 
>   No workaround is currently available for earlier versions of fish, although
>   the use of the fish_config tool is optional as other interfaces to fish
>   configuration are available.
> 
>   https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/issues/1438
> 
> The patches going into 2.1.1 can be retrieved from the Integration_2.1.1 branch
> on Github if you would like to patch your own source or packages without
> updating to 2.1.1:
> https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/tree/Integration_2.1.1
>   10642a34f17ae45bd93be3ae6021ee920d3da0c2
>   8412c867a501e3a68e55fef6215e86d3ac9f617b
>   c0989dce2d882c94eb3183e7b94402ba53534abb
> 
> Although at this stage we won't be issuing a 2.0.1 release, the patches have
> been backported to the 2.0.0 branch for distributions that would prefer not to
> upgrade to the 2.1 series:
> https://github.com/fish-shell/fish-shell/tree/Integration_2.0.1
>   216d32055d99fbae563ad048436830187a8bfceb
>   aea9ad4965d24ef9c4e346f906194820bac70cc9
>   55986120aa2cc8ab0809db8ca1f8116491c1fb14
> 
> David Adam
> fish committer
> zanchey@....gu.uwa.edu.au
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> 

Cheers,

David Adam
zanchey@....gu.uwa.edu.au
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