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Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 19:00:17 -0800
From: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: security@...ntu.com
Subject: CVE Request: thermald

Hello,

I discovered that the thermald temperature management daemon opens a file
with predictable filename in /tmp unsafely. Please assign a CVE number for
this issue:

https://github.com/01org/thermal_daemon/blob/master/src/android_main.cpp#L117


In short:

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
	/* ... */
	if (!no_daemon) {
		daemonize((char *) "/tmp/", (char *) "/tmp/thermald.pid");
	} else

/* ... */

static void daemonize(char *rundir, char *pidfile) {
	/* ... */

	pid_file_handle = open(pidfile, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);


thermald runs as root; on systems that lack the Openwall-inspired symlink
and hardlink protections in world-writable directories this can be used to
write the process's pid to a file of the attacker's choosing.

Note that this affects only the main() function provided in the
android_main.cpp file; the main() routine in main.cpp does not have this
issue.

Thanks

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