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Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2014 16:37:21 -0500
From: "CERT(R) Coordination Center" <cert@...t.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: "CERT(R) Coordination Center" <cert@...t.org>
Subject: Vendor adoption of PIE INFO#934476 oss-security

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Hi folks,

We had originally notified Linux vendors individually through our
normal channels, but it has come to our attention that this could
perhaps be a better forum to have a discussion about the topic.

We recently published a blog post about the state of ASLR/PIE on Linux
compared to how it is on Windows:
<https://www.cert.org/blogs/certcc/post.cfm?EntryID=191>

tl;dr: On x86 Linux, there's a significant performance impact to PIE,
however on the x86_64 platform it's not so clear whether the
performance impact is significant enough to stop widespread use of
PIE.

This is where we are looking for input from the Linux vendors.  It has
been reported <http://nebelwelt.net/publications/12TRpie/gccPIE-TR120614.pdf>:
2.4 PIE and x64
<snip>  
... "A quick evaluation for x64 reports an average overhead of 3.61%
and a geometric mean of 2.34% for an -O3 optimization level on the
same system using the "test" dataset of SPEC CPU2006."

For those environments that put a high value on security, it would
seem that a 2-3% overhead might be acceptable.  Though being a
compile-time option, it would seem that the "faster" vs. "more secure"
decision would need to be made ahead of time by the vendor.  And
obviously, one size does not fit all.

Thoughts?  What is stopping you from enabling PIE for everything, at
least on the x86_64 platform?


Thank you,
   Will Dormann

=============================
Vulnerability Analyst
CERT Coordination Center
4500 Fifth Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
1-412-268-7090
=============================


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