Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2014 12:49:08 +0000 From: Xen.org security team <security@....org> To: xen-announce@...ts.xen.org, xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Xen.org security team <security@....org> Subject: Xen Security Advisory 83 - Out-of-memory condition yielding memory corruption during IRQ setup -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory XSA-83 version 2 Out-of-memory condition yielding memory corruption during IRQ setup UPDATES IN VERSION 2 ==================== Public release. ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= When setting up the IRQ for a passed through physical device, a flaw in the error handling could result in a memory allocation being used after it is freed, and then freed a second time. This would typically result in memory corruption. IMPACT ====== Malicious guest administrators can trigger a use-after-free error, resulting in hypervisor memory corruption. The effects of memory corruption could be anything, including a host-wide denial of service, or privilege escalation. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== Xen 4.2.x and later are vulnerable. Xen 4.1.x and earlier are not vulnerable. Only systems making use of device passthrough are vulnerable. Only systems with a 64-bit hypervisor configured to support more than 128 CPUs or with a 32-bit hypervisor configured to support more than 64 CPUs are vulnerable. MITIGATION ========== This issue can be avoided by not assigning PCI devices to untrusted guests on systems supporting Intel VT-d or AMD Vi. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Coverity Scan, prompted by modelling improvements contributed by Andrew Coooper. The issue was diagnosed by Matthew Daley and Andrew Coooper. The patch was prepared by Andrew Cooper. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. xsa83.patch Xen 4.2.x, Xen 4.3.x, xen-unstable $ sha256sum xsa83*.patch 71ba62c024ed867f99f335ed63d7e04a7981d348cc29a3718e5c48f15a1e0fb1 xsa83.patch $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJS4Q+yAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZjQQIALVrMD9bMEfBbQJ6ZvZZBP2f g8y7FvzGMC2fiP1gPyOxwHYI2lAsT6euiFgEunamlWAtTpgFhTeXLrx/pbdKpMv9 AwWA94umPrSSNVoUGtX9JqPcg9lzWCxgTjkKcmGyH6Yo/Z78juYeQMTss3/DQ0ms asIYS011i/6lyKDo1XKJiabzOYI0F/R1JQEDnaVZBTk57+1Ux+9acnt5KK1dt9t3 KpcOQCiJKqVDFMaQ0NmTUQS7pC/5N/QZRe5AdMG1LhJI7Yw5tbHnTxdSYxnprQEn KUJfYQYycp4XJU7U6GMFE0Ybqf3FMlNqS+KHcetgN7XA6C8xjyDoMIUsGzA9/3E= =P/H4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/octet-stream SKIPPED ]
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