Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2014 11:32:40 -0500 From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@...thhorseman.net> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, fweimer@...hat.com CC: cve-assign@...re.org Subject: Re: Re: kwallet crypto misuse On 01/02/2014 08:03 AM, cve-assign@...re.org wrote: >> http://gaganpreet.in/blog/2013/07/24/kwallet-security-analysis/ > >> KWallet uses QDataStream, which encodes QString objects (used in >> KWallet maps) as UTF-16. So, the string "abcd" will be stored as >> "\0a\0b\0c\0d", which gives four bytes of information per block. > > Does anyone know whether the KWallet user interface could make it > possible to enter passwords containing 16-bit characters (i.e., > characters that cannot be represented using 8 bits)? If that would not > be possible, then this issue could potentially qualify for an > additional CVE assignment. according to its man page, kwalletcli itself assumes strings are input at UTF-8. This is not exactly "16-bit characters", but it's certainly possible to input characters that are beyond unicode codepoint U+7f (or U+ff if you prefer that limit). kwalletaskpass also uses whatever keyboard entry mechanism your X11 session is configured for, and can easily accept whatever characters you can generate with your keyboard -- much of the world uses keyboards where at least some key combinations (e.g. €, which is U+20AC) generate characters outside of the standard 7-bit ASCII range. I had no trouble entering a passphrase with ♥ (U+2665) just now. Of course, none of this suggests that the cleartext of these strings is evenly distributed bitwise (or byte-wise). It clearly isn't. That said, very little cleartext *is* high-entropy in this way. Do you think MITRE or other folks should be recommending pre-whitening the strings before encrypting them (e.g. by compressing them before encrypting)? compressing before encryption smells like a possible gateway to something like a CRIME attack in some circumstances, so i think this proposal in general might be riskier than we'd like. Regards, --dkg [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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