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Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2013 08:30:06 +0200
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: dvyukov@...gle.com
Subject: linux kernel memory corruption with ipv6 udp offloading

Hi!

I guess the following patch might be worth a CVE:

| [PATCH] ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
| 
| In the following scenario the socket is corked:
| If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
| write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
| than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
| plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
| 
| In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
| same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
| is available.
| 
| This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
| cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
| (instead of sutracting it again).
| 
| Found with trinity.

While writing a reproducer to test this patch, I have seen silent memory
corruption (which later manifests as e.g. a panic or hangs on shutdown)
and oopses.

It has been reported to netdev by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
and was found with the AddressSanitizer for the kernel[1] and trinity.

The patch is queued up for stable:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/276835/
and is already committed to linux-net:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git/commit/?id=2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47

I guess the erroneous behaviour was introduced here:
| git describe --contains e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac
| v2.6.15-rc1~731^2~31

The reproducers are available on request.

[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel

Thanks,

  Hannes

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