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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02:46:52 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: evolution mail client GPG key selection
issue
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On 07/21/2013 02:02 PM, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> Hi,
>
> an issue with security impact was recently fixed in Evolution.
> More details can be found on the Red Hat bug report at
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=973728 but it
> basically boils down to a wrong selection when choosing the the
> keyid for a destination email address.
>
> Basically, when you have multiple keys in the keyrings, with
> overlapping email addresses (like foo@...mple.com and
> foobar@...mple.com), you can end up (silently) encrypting to the
> wrong recipient.
>
> It actually happened to me when forwarding embargoed security
> issues so it can happen in real life. Now the wrong recipient would
> need to actually obtain a copy of the sent mail (since it's sent to
> the correct recipient, not the wrong one), but I still think it
> warrants a CVE.
>
> Quick fix was to use the documented format for email searches in
> GnuPG (using <> around email addresses) but a more complete fix for
> explicit key selection should appear some time in the future.
>
> Regards,
Yeah this was discussed internally a bit at Red Hat after you filed
the bug, it's a messy problem. I think one concern was where do you
want to place policy decisions for key usage and trust, in GPG, in the
app using it, or something else? One concern I have is I sometimes
used to (not any more!) download all the signing keys for keys I was
using to see if I could establish a web of trust. Of course anyone can
sign someone elses key and upload that to the public key servers, so
then the potential for grabbing a key from a bad guy increases
significantly.
Any ways for evolutions please use CVE-2013-4166 for this issue. Has
anyone checked other popular mail clients like thunderbird/mutt/etc?
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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