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Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2013 10:34:23 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: kseifried@...hat.com
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
Brian Martin <brian@...nsecurityfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Re: Summary of security bugs (now fixed) in user namespaces
On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 2:01 AM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 04/15/2013 04:45 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Brian Martin
>> <brian@...nsecurityfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Andy;
>>>
>>> : I previously reported these bugs privatley. I'm summarizing
>>> them for
>>>
>>> : the historical record. These bugs were never exploitable on a
>>> : default-configured released kernel, but some 3.8 versions are :
>>> vulnerable depending on configuration.
>>>
>>> Do you know if these were patched, and therefore possibly
>>> disclosed via the commits? With these details, it is difficult to
>>> line them up to existing reports.
>>
>> Bug 1 should be fixed in:
>>
>> commit 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d Author: Eric W.
>> Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 15 01:45:51 2013
>> -0700
>>
>> userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
>
> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
AFAIK it does not.
>
>> Bug 2 is should be fixed by these:
>>
>> commit 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45 Author: Eric W.
>> Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 22 03:10:15 2013
>> -0700
>>
>> vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
>>
>> commit 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 Author: Eric W.
>> Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 22 04:08:05 2013
>> -0700
>>
>> vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
>
> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
AFAIK it does not.
>
>> Bug 3 should be fixed in:
>>
>> commit 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349 Author: Eric W.
>> Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Date: Fri Mar 15 01:03:33 2013
>> -0700
>>
>> scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
>
> Can you confirm this has no CVE?
>
AFAIK it does not.
--Andy
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