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Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 18:09:37 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Damien Regad <damien.regad@...ckgroup.com>
Subject: Re: Multiple CVE requests for MantisBT

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On 04/04/2013 05:17 PM, Damien Regad wrote:
> Greetings,
> 
> The following 4 issues were discovered in the Mantis Bug Tracker:
> 
> 
> 1. Close button available to users despite workflow restrictions
> 
> This issue affects Mantis 1.2.12 and later.
> 
> It allows low-privileged users to close issues even though the
> workflow settings do not permit it.
> 
> Reference: http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=15453

Please use CVE-2013-1930 for this issue.

> 2. XSS vulnerability when deleting a version
> 
> This issue affects Mantis 1.2.14 only.
> 
> Arbitrary JavaScript could be executed in the client's browser when
> deleting a version containing embedded code in its name. The
> criticality of this issue is compounded by the fact that a
> high-privilege account (typically project manager or administrator)
> is required to both to create and delete a version.
> 
> Reference: http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=15511

Please use CVE-2013-1931 for this issue.

> 3. XSS vulnerability on Configuration Report page
> 
> This issue affects Mantis 1.2.13 only [1].
> 
> If the system defines a Project containing embedded JavaScript code
> in its name, that code would be executed in the client's browser
> when displaying the configuration report page
> (adm_config_report.php).
> 
> The severity of this issue is mitigated by the need to have a 
> high-privileged account both to set the project's name and to
> access the configuration report page.
> 
> Reference: http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=15415

Please use CVE-2013-1932 for this issue.

> 4. XSS issue on Configuration Report page when displaying complex
> value
> 
> This issue affects Mantis 1.2.0rc1 and later.
> 
> Lack of proper string escaping allows users (having admin access)
> to enter arbitrary javascript code and have it executed on the
> user's browser.
> 
> Reference: http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=15416

Does this count as a proper release or does it fall into the "beta"
classification?

> 
> Issues resolution:
> 
> - 1 & 2 will be fixed in upcoming release 1.2.15, expected to go
> live sometime next week (patches are available in the referenced
> issues)
> 
> - 3 & 4 were both resolved in version 1.2.14, released on
> 29-Jan-2013
> 
> 
> Could you kindly assign CVEs for the above issues ? Thanks in
> advance.
> 
> 
> Best regards, D. Regad MantisBT Developer http://www.mantisbt.org
> 
> [1] MantisBT version 1.2.13 was tagged in the repository but never
> formally released, as we discovered several critical issues at the
> last minute and decided to pull it and released 1.2.14 a week later
> instead.
> 
> 


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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