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Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 22:31:03 +1100
From: David Hicks <d@...id.au>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Jakub Galczyk <jakub.galczyk@...il.com>
Subject: CVE request: MantisBT before 1.2.13 match_type XSS vulnerability

Hi list,

Jakub Galczyk discovered[1][2] a cross site scripting (XSS)
vulnerability in MantisBT 1.2.12 and earlier versions that allows a
malicious person to trick the browser of a target user into executing
arbitrary JavaScript via the URL: search.php?match_type="><script...

This vulnerability is particularly wide reaching due to search.php being
usable by anonymous users on public facing installations of MantisBT (no
user account required).

Patches against 1.2.x and master branches are attached and alternatively
available at [2].

References:
[1]
http://hauntit.blogspot.de/2013/01/en-mantis-bug-tracker-1212-persistent.html
[2] http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=15373

The MantisBT project will release MantisBT 1.2.13 shortly and advise
popular Linux distributions packaging MantisBT to either apply the patch
or bump package versions to 1.2.13.

Can a CVE ID please be assigned to this issue?

With thanks,
David Hicks
MantisBT Developer
#mantisbt irc.freenode.net
http://www.mantisbt.org/bugs/

Bcc: mantisbt-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net

From bbc6b4f3ea8d0a53ae8c44e4218df6675a4e5fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Hicks <d@...id.au>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 21:43:21 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix #15373: match_type XSS vulnerability

Jakub Galczyk discovered[1] a cross site scripting (XSS)
vulnerability in MantisBT 1.2.12 and earlier versions that allows a
malicious person to trick the browser of a target user into executing
arbitrary JavaScript via the URL: search.php?match_type="><script...

This vulnerability is particularly wide reaching due to search.php being
usable by anonymous users on public facing installations of MantisBT (no
user account required).

The value of the "match_type" filter parameter is now correctly
sanitised prior to use in the HTML output displaying the current filter
settings.

[1] http://hauntit.blogspot.de/2013/01/en-mantis-bug-tracker-1212-persistent.html
---
 core/filter_api.php | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/core/filter_api.php b/core/filter_api.php
index 2286ff0..ce2ca4f 100644
--- a/core/filter_api.php
+++ b/core/filter_api.php
@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ function filter_draw_selection_area2( $p_page_number, $p_for_screen = true, $p_e
 					echo lang_get ('filter_match_all');
 				}
 			?>
-			<input type="hidden" name="match_type" value="<?php echo $t_filter[FILTER_PROPERTY_MATCH_TYPE]?>"/>
+			<input type="hidden" name="match_type" value="<?php echo string_attribute( $t_filter[FILTER_PROPERTY_MATCH_TYPE] )?>"/>
 			</td>
 			<td colspan="6">&#160;</td>
 		</tr>
-- 
1.8.1.1


From f5ac454eb63fde102347a021a2af0c535033d572 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Hicks <d@...id.au>
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 21:43:21 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix #15373: match_type XSS vulnerability

Jakub Galczyk discovered[1] a cross site scripting (XSS)
vulnerability in MantisBT 1.2.12 and earlier versions that allows a
malicious person to trick the browser of a target user into executing
arbitrary JavaScript via the URL: search.php?match_type="><script...

This vulnerability is particularly wide reaching due to search.php being
usable by anonymous users on public facing installations of MantisBT (no
user account required).

The value of the "match_type" filter parameter is now correctly
sanitised prior to use in the HTML output displaying the current filter
settings.

[1] http://hauntit.blogspot.de/2013/01/en-mantis-bug-tracker-1212-persistent.html
---
 core/filter_api.php | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/core/filter_api.php b/core/filter_api.php
index 37f6d04..e6b7c99 100644
--- a/core/filter_api.php
+++ b/core/filter_api.php
@@ -3395,7 +3395,7 @@ function filter_draw_selection_area2( $p_page_number, $p_for_screen = true, $p_e
 					echo lang_get ('filter_match_all');
 				}
 			?>
-			<input type="hidden" name="match_type" value="<?php echo $t_filter[FILTER_PROPERTY_MATCH_TYPE]?>"/>
+			<input type="hidden" name="match_type" value="<?php echo string_attribute( $t_filter[FILTER_PROPERTY_MATCH_TYPE] )?>"/>
 			</td>
 			<td colspan="6">&#160;</td>
 		</tr>		
-- 
1.8.1.1


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