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Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 17:55:14 -0500 (EST)
From: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...-smtp.mitre.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@...ian.org>
Subject: Re: CVE request: Curl insecure usage
Kurt,
My read is that these are fairly straightforward issues, although the
number of implementations with this problem may be rather high :-(
opendnssec calls libcurl with an incorrect value "true" that's effectively
treated as the number 1, which is an insecure CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST
value. So, opendnssec didn't call the API correctly - so the problem
rests with opendnssec.
For the handful of people interested - this is a kind of type confusion or
incorrect conversion error that affects a language other than C! Kinda
cute.
For PHPcas, this is just calling the API with an insecure
CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST value, period.
So, I'd say that these faulty implementations each deserve their own CVE,
instead of a single ID for Curl.
- Steve
On Mon, 26 Nov 2012, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 11/26/2012 08:06 AM, Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
>> Hi, during the triage of the SSL client bugs spotted by the
>> http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf paper Debian
>> developer Alessandro Ghedini discovered two more applications using
>> Curl in an insecure manner:
>>
>> 1. opendnssec (in the eppclient tool)
>> http://lists.opendnssec.org/pipermail/opendnssec-user/2012-November/002296.html
>>
>> 2. PHPcas (used by Moodle e.g.):
>> https://github.com/Jasig/phpCAS/pull/58
>>
>> Please assign CVE IDs for these.
>>
>> Cheers, Moritz
>>
>
> Have these been receiving individual CVE's? I can't find any offhand,
> can you provide examples of others?
>
> - --
> Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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