Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 02:36:11 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Gajim fails to handle invalid certificates

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 11/14/2012 02:19 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 11/14/2012 08:19 AM, Kurt Seiifried wrote:
> 
>> So do we consider this to be an OpenSSL issue of gajim? I'm sure
>> gajim is not the only program that does something like this.
> 
> As far as I understand things, it is not necessarily at all to set
> a verification callback in OpenSSL.  If you load the root
> certificate store and examine SSL_get_verify_result, that should be
> sufficient.  You can even look at the peer certificate and continue
> anyway if the user has overridden the certificate validity.  So
> far, I haven't found a good reason to use a verify callback at all.
> You need it to implement a custom PKIX validation policy, but that
> should be pretty rare.  (I still have to check older OpenSSL
> versions, though, perhaps there, the behavior was different.)
> 
> Anyway, if application developers set a verification callback, it
> is their responsibility to implement it correctly.  Therefore, I
> don't think this is an OpenSSL issue.

Makes sense, just wanted to confirm this problem resides within Gajim.
Please use CVE-2012-5524 for this issue.


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://www.enigmail.net/
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=sFXa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.