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Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 02:36:11 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Gajim fails to handle invalid certificates

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On 11/14/2012 02:19 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 11/14/2012 08:19 AM, Kurt Seiifried wrote:
> 
>> So do we consider this to be an OpenSSL issue of gajim? I'm sure
>> gajim is not the only program that does something like this.
> 
> As far as I understand things, it is not necessarily at all to set
> a verification callback in OpenSSL.  If you load the root
> certificate store and examine SSL_get_verify_result, that should be
> sufficient.  You can even look at the peer certificate and continue
> anyway if the user has overridden the certificate validity.  So
> far, I haven't found a good reason to use a verify callback at all.
> You need it to implement a custom PKIX validation policy, but that
> should be pretty rare.  (I still have to check older OpenSSL
> versions, though, perhaps there, the behavior was different.)
> 
> Anyway, if application developers set a verification callback, it
> is their responsibility to implement it correctly.  Therefore, I
> don't think this is an OpenSSL issue.

Makes sense, just wanted to confirm this problem resides within Gajim.
Please use CVE-2012-5524 for this issue.


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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