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Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:12:27 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>, Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@...el.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- librdmacm (one issue) / ibacm (two
 issues)

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On 10/11/2012 09:47 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> multiple issues has been found in tools enabling InfiniBand
> functionality:
> 
> Issue #1 librdmacm - Tried to connect to port 6125 if ibacm.port
> was not found: 
> ===============================================================================
>
> 
A security flaw was found in the way librdmacm, a userspace RDMA
Communication
> Managment API allowing to specify connections using TCP/IP
> addresses even though it opens RDMA specific connections, performed
> binding to the underlying ib_acm service (librdmacm used default
> port value of 6125 to bind to ib_acm service). An attacker able to
> run a rogue ib_acm service could use this flaw to make librdmacm
> applications to use potentially bogus address resolution
> information.
> 
> References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=865483 
> Upstream patch:
> http://git.openfabrics.org/git?p=~shefty/librdmacm.git;a=commitdiff;h=4b5c1aa734e0e734fc2ba3cd41d0ddf02170af6d
>
>  Credit: This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat
> Product Security Team.

Please use CVE-2012-4516 for this issue.

> Issue #2 ibacm - DoS (ib_acm deamon crash) by joining responses for
> multicast destinations: 
> ===========================================================================================
>
> 
A denial of service flaw was found in the way ibacm, an InfiniBand
communication manager
> assistant, performed management of reference counts for multicast
> connections. The default reference count value for multicast
> connection is set to zero and when the multicast connection got
> released, an attempt was made to free it, possibly resulting in
> ib_acm service / daemon crash.
> 
> References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=865492 
> Relevant upstream patch:
> http://git.openfabrics.org/git?p=~shefty/ibacm.git;a=commit;h=c7d28b35d64333c262de3ec972c426423dadccf9
>
>  Issue previously corrected by upstream and its security
> implications pointed out later by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product
> Security Team.

Please use CVE-2012-4517 for this issue.

> Issue #3 ibacm - ib_acm service files created with world writable
> permissions (DoS): 
> ====================================================================================
>
> 
A security flaw was found in the way ibacm, an InfiniBand communication
manager
> assistant, created files used by ib_acm service - they were created
> with world writable permissions. A local attacker could use this
> flaw to 1) overwrite content of ib_acm daemon log file or 2)
> overwrite content of ib_acm daemon ibacm.port file (ability to mask
> certain actions or cause ib_acm to run on non-default port).
> 
> References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=865499 
> Relevant upstream patch:
> http://git.openfabrics.org/git?p=~shefty/ibacm.git;a=commit;h=d204fca2b6298d7799e918141ea8e11e7ad43cec
>
>  Credit: This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat
> Product Security Team.

Please use CVE-2012-4518 for this issue.

> --
> 
> Could you allocate CVE identifiers for these?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team
> 


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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