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Date: Fri, 05 Oct 2012 12:37:52 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Vit Ondruch <vondruch@...hat.com>,
        Ruby Security Team <security@...y-lang.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- ruby (1.8.x with patched CVE-2011-1005):
 Incomplete fix for CVE-2011-1005 for NameError#to_s method when used on objects

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On 10/05/2012 09:26 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> Originally, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures assigned an
> identifier of CVE-2011-1005 to the following vulnerability:
> 
> The safe-level feature in Ruby 1.8.6 through 1.8.6-420, 1.8.7 
> through 1.8.7-330, and 1.8.8dev allows context-dependent attackers
> to modify strings via the Exception#to_s method, as demonstrated by
> changing an intended pathname.
> 
> with the following upstream patch: [1]
> http://svn.ruby-lang.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi?revision=30903&view=revision
>
>  Based on later upstream patch for different (CVE-2012-4464 and
> CVE-2012-4466) issues: [2]
> http://svn.ruby-lang.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi?view=revision&revision=37068
>
>  it was found that original upstream 1.8.x ruby patch for
> CVE-2011-1005 issue was not complete, when the NameError#to_s()
> method was used on / with Ruby objects (the test logic in
> 'test_to_s_taintness_propagation' test from [1] was actually
> reversed {Hint: Compare the test for Ruby Object cases in both [1]
> and [2]}, so the test returned success also on still vulnerable
> instances).
> 
> A different vulnerability than CVE-2011-1005, CVE-2012-4464, and
> CVE-2012-4466.
> 
> References: [3] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=863484
> 
> This issue was discovered by Vit Ondruch of Red Hat.
> 
> Ruby Security Team previously in a private email to Vit confirmed 
> (still) presence of this issue on ruby 1.8.7 versions and provided 
> a patch for it: <snip> The behavior of SVN trunk is correct.
> 
> The fix for CVE-2011-1005 was insufficient, and NameError#to_s has
> a problem in 1.8.7.
> 
> Please apply the attached patch for 1.8.7.
> 
> -- Shugo Maeda
> 
> error.c.diff
> 
> --- error.c.orig	2012-10-04 23:26:42.000611741 +0900 +++ error.c
> 2012-10-04 23:26:48.960524245 +0900 @@ -665,9 +665,6 @@
> 
> if (NIL_P(mesg)) return rb_class_name(CLASS_OF(exc)); 
> StringValue(str); -    if (str != mesg) { -	OBJ_INFECT(str, mesg); 
> -    } return str; }
> 
> </snip>
> 
> Could you allocate a CVE identifier to this (for those package
> versions, which have applied patch for originally CVE-2011-1005
> already)?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team
> 

Please use CVE-2012-4481 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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