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Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2012 09:29:27 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Noriko Hosoi <nhosoi@...hat.com>, Rich Megginson <rmeggins@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- 389-ds-base: Change on SLAPI_MODRDN_NEWSUPERIOR
 is not evaluated in ACL (ACL rules bypass possible)

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Hash: SHA1

On 09/26/2012 03:54 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> Noriko Hosoi of Red Hat notified us about the following
> deficiency:
> 
> A possibility to bypass access control list (ACL) definitions was
> found in the way 389 Directory Server performed LDAP modifyRDN
> operation upon request from client. When a user has been granted
> access to set of DN entries, but denied access to a specific subset
> of those entries, it was possible the user to obtain temporary
> (till next Directory Server restart) access to that subset of
> entries (they should not have had otherwise ability to access) when
> the DN entry was moved via database modify RDN function.
> 
> Upstream ticket: [1] https://fedorahosted.org/389/ticket/340
> 
> Relevant upstream patch: [2]
> http://git.fedorahosted.org/cgit/389/ds.git/commit/?id=5beb93d42efb807838c09c5fab898876876f8d09
>
>  Could you allocate a CVE id for this?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team

Please use CVE-2012-4450 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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