[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2012 05:55:09 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: vcizek@...e.de
Subject: Re: CVE request(?): gpg: improper file permssions set when en/de-crypting files
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 12:37:00PM +0200, Tomas Mraz wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-09-21 at 12:20 +0200, Matthias Weckbecker wrote:
> > # de-crypting
> > % gpg sikrit.gpg
> > % ll sikrit*
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 gp users 12 Sep 17 09:41 sikrit
> > -rw------- 1 gp users 480 Sep 17 09:40 sikrit.gpg
[...]
> I suppose the permissions respect the user's umask so I do not think
> this is a real security issue in the gpg itself. Although using the
> permissions of the original file when creating the decrypted/encrypted
> one (still modified with the user's umask) would be more appropriate. So
> in my opinion this does not warrant a CVE but improvement in the
> upstream gnupg code would be appreciated I think.
Agreed, and the "still modified with the user's umask" portion is very
important. I assume you mean orig.st_mode & ~umask. With open(...,
O_CREAT | ..., orig.st_mode) this does not need to be explicit, but with
fchmod() it does.
(Sorry for stating the obvious, but I am concerned that someone might
patch GnuPG to just chmod to the original file's perms ignoring umask,
which would be a dangerous change of behavior.)
Alexander
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
