Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:25:30 -0400 (EDT) From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com> To: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Jeff Law <law@...hat.com>, Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com> Subject: CVE Request -- glibc: strcoll() integer overflow leading to buffer overflow + another alloca() stack overflow issue (upstream #14547 && #14552) Hello Kurt, Steve, Florian, Jeff, Jakub, vendors, 1) Issue #1: ------------ An integer overflow, leading to buffer overflow flaw was found in the way the implementation of strcoll() routine, used to compare two strings based on the current locale, of glibc, the GNU libc libraries, performed calculation of memory requirements / allocation, needed for storage of the strings. If an application linked against glibc was missing an application-level sanity checks for validity of strcoll() arguments and accepted untrusted input, an attacker could use this flaw to cause the particular application to crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application. Upstream bug report (including reproducer):  http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14547 References:  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=855385 Could you allocate a CVE identifier for this? 2) Issue #2 (mentioned here only for completeness, but I am not of the opinion this should receive a CVE identifier. See argumentation below [but open to glibc upstream / others to disprove it]). alloca() stack overflow (first issue from the report below) Upstream bug report:  http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14552 If I have looked correctly this is expected / known behaviour of alloca() - from the manual page:  http://linux.die.net/man/3/alloca "Return Value The alloca() function returns a pointer to the beginning of the allocated space. If the allocation causes stack overflow, program behavior is undefined." Under my opinion the above description covers also the case of 'alloca() stack overflow' as reported in bug . Further opinions / upstream comments appreciated though. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team
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