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Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 12:15:00 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: "Xen.org security team" <security@....org>, xen-announce@...ts.xen.org,
        xen-devel@...ts.xen.org, xen-users@...ts.xen.org
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 19 - guest administrator
 can access qemu monitor console

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On 09/06/2012 10:13 AM, Xen.org security team wrote:
>                  Xen Security Advisory XSA-19
> 
>          guest administrator can access qemu monitor console
> 
> 
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION
> =================
> 
> A guest administrator who is granted access to the graphical console
> of a Xen guest can access the qemu monitor.  The monitor can be used
> to access host resources.
> 
> IMPACT
> ======
> 
> A malicious guest administrator can access host resources (perhaps
> belonging to other guests or the underlying system) and may be able to
> escalate their privilege to that of the host.
> 
> VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
> ==================
> 
> Installations where guest administrators do not have access to a
> domain's graphical console, or containing only PV domains configured
> without a graphical console, are not vulnerable.
> 
> Installations where all guest administrators are trustworthy are not
> vulnerable, even if the guest operating systems themselves are
> untrusted.
> 
> Systems using xend/xm: At least all versions since Xen 4.0 are
> affected.  Systems are vulnerable even if "monitor=no" is specified in
> the xm domain configuration file - this configuration option is not
> properly honoured in the vulnerable versions.
> 
> Systems using libxl/xl: All versions are affected.  The "monitor="
> option is not understood, and is therefore ignored, by xl.  However,
> systems using the experimental device model version based on upstream
> qemu are NOT vulnerable; that is, Xen 4.2 RC systems with
> device_model_version="qemu_xen" specified in the xl domain config
> file.
> 
> Systems using libvirt are vulnerable.  For "xen:" URIs, see xend/xm,
> above.  For "libxl:" URIs, all versions are affected.
> 
> Systems based on the Xen Cloud Platform are NOT vulnerable.
> 
> CONFIRMING VULNERABILITY
> ========================
> 
> Connect to the guest's VNC (or SDL) graphical display and make sure
> your focus is in that window.  Hold down CTRL and ALT and press 2.
> You will see a black screen showing one of "serial0", "parallel0" or
> "QEMU <version> monitor".  Repeat this exercise for other digits 3 to
> 6.  CTRL+ALT+1 is the domain's normal graphical console.  Not all
> numbers will have screens attached, but note that you must release and
> re-press CTRL and ALT each time.
> 
> If one of the accessible screens shows "QEMU <version> monitor" then
> you are vulnerable.  Otherwise you are not.
> 
> MITIGATION
> ==========
> 
> With xl in Xen 4.1 and later, supplying the following config
> option in the VM configuration file will disable the monitor:
>    device_model_args=["-monitor","null"]
> 
> With xend the following config option will disable the monitor:
>    monitor_path="null"
> Note that with a vulnerable version of the software specifying
> "monitor=0" will NOT disable the monitor.
> 
> We are not currently aware of the availability of mitigation for
> systems using libvirt.
> 
> NOTE REGARDING EMBARGO
> ======================
> 
> This issue was publicly discussed online by its discoverer.
> There is therefore no embargo.
> 
> NOTE REGARDING CVE
> ==================
> 
> This issue was previously reported in a different context, not to Xen
> upstream, and assigned CVE-2007-0998 and fixed in a different way.  We
> have requested a new CVE for XSA-19 but it is not yet available.

Ahh I see the request now (it was in a different email folder). Please
use CVE-2012-4411 for this issue.

> RESOLUTION
> ==========
> 
> The attached patch against qemu-xen-traditional
> (qemu-xen-4.*-testing.git) resolves this issue.
> 
> $ sha256sum xsa19-qemu-all.patch
> 19fc5ff9334e7e7ad429388850dc6e52e7062c21a677082e7a89c2f2c91365fa  xsa19-qemu-all.patch
> 

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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