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Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2012 10:55:03 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Mark Hoopes <xync@...c.org>
Subject: Re: Arbitrary File Upload/Execution in Collabtive
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On 06/06/2012 07:02 AM, Mark Hoopes wrote:
> This disclosure was posted to Bugtraq yesterday
> (http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/522973/30/0/threaded). I
> am submitting it to oss-security as a request to have a CVE ID
> assigned.
>
> TITLE: Arbitrary File Upload/Execution in Collabtive DATE:
> 06-04-2012 PRODUCT: Collabtive Web-Based Project Management
> Software (http://collabtive.o-dyn.de/) VERSIONS: 0.7.5, 0.6.1
> confirmed. All versions <= 0.7.5 probable RESEARCHER: Mark Hoopes
> (xync@...c.org/) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
> http://xync.org/2012/06/04/Arbitrary-File-Upload-in-Collabtive.html
>
> Vulnerability: During the upload of an avatar image for a
> Collabtive user, the manageuser.php script checks the file type
> using the MIME type provided in the POST request (via the
> $_FILES['userfile']['type'] variable) rather than by extension.
> This MIME type can be spoofed via an intercepting proxy or custom
> POST script allowing a malicious user to upload an arbitrary file.
> This file will be placed in a predictable web accessible path with
> an easily determined name. In most installations, execution from
> this directory is not restricted which allows a remote attacker to
> execute a PHP script uploaded this way with the privileges of the
> web user.
>
> Access to the avatar upload function is restricted to logged in
> users, but because of Collabtive's design decisions in implementing
> OpenID support, this is easily accomplished. If an unknown user
> supplies a valid OpenID v1.0 URL as the username on the login page,
> Collabtive will automatically create a new user based on the
> referenced credentials. That new user is not authorized to access
> any projects, but is authorized to upload an avatar image. This
> allows an attacker with no other knowledge of the host site or its
> users to exploit the vulnerability.
>
> Fix: Upgrade to Collabtive v0.7.6 or greater Source:
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/collabtive/files/collabtive/0.7.6/collabtive076.zip/download
>
> Release Notes: http://www.collabtive.o-dyn.de/blog/?p=426
>
> Workaround: Disable script execution of the upload directory via
> .htaccess for Apache or similar web servers. This should apply at
> minimum to the /files/[template]/avatar directory but can safely be
> applied to the entire /files directory.
>
> Sample contents of the .htaccess file are: Options -Indexes Options
> -ExecCGI AddHandler cgi-script .php .php3 .php4 .phtml .pl .py .jsp
> .asp .htm .shtml .sh .cgi
>
> Note 'AllowOverride Options AddHandler' or 'AllowOverride All' must
> be enabled in the main httpd.conf file for this directory or
> inherited from a parent directory. See
> http://www.mysql-apache-php.com/fileupload-security.htm
>
> Additional References:
> http://xync.org/2012/06/04/Arbitrary-File-Upload-in-Collabtive.html
>
> http://www.php.net/manual/en/features.file-upload.post-method.php
> see comments for $_FILES['userfile']['type']
>
>
> TIMELINE: April 18, 2012 - Issue reported to developers April 19,
> 2012 - Fix committed to Collabtive github May 30, 2012 -
> Collabtive version 0.7.6 released w/ fix June 4, 2012 -
> Vulnerability published
>
Please use CVE-2012-2670 for this issue.
BTW very nicely formatted/informative email, well done. Also bonus
points for offering a workaround =).
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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