oss-security - CVE id request: devotee (debian vote engine) cryptographically weak random numbers permit discovery of secret ballot submissions

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Date: Fri, 18 May 2012 17:48:22 -0400
From: Michael Gilbert <mgilbert@...ian.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE id request: devotee (debian vote engine) cryptographically weak
 random numbers permit discovery of secret ballot submissions

Hi,

It has been disclosed [0] that the debian vote engine (devotee) [1]
uses cryptographically weak pseudo-random numbers (intended to be
48-bit, but really only 32-bit due to the use of a 32-bit seed feeding
the 48-bit number generator) to generate ballot secret monikers.  This
allows unprivileged persons to brute force the contents of presumably
secret election ballots, and makes it possible to calculate the
contents of secret voter ballots in all past debian elections.

Ideally, devotee should use a random secret moniker with fully 64 (or
preferably 128) bits that would require years rather than minutes or
days to brute force [2].

The source also uses /dev/urandom, which has less entropy than /dev/random.

Please assign an id for this issue.

Thanks,
Mike

[0] https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2012/04/msg00528.html
[1] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=users/srivasta/debian/devotee.git
[2] http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2006/07/brute-force-key-attacks-are-for-dummies.html

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