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Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 09:09:19 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request -- kernel: macvtap: zerocopy: vector
 length is not validated before pinning user pages

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On 04/19/2012 08:28 AM, Petr Matousek wrote:
> Currently we do not validate the vector length before calling 
> get_user_pages_fast(), host stack could be easily overflowed by 
> malicious guest driver who gives us a descriptors with length
> greater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
> 
> A privileged guest user could use this flaw to induce stack
> overflow on the host with attacker non-controlled data (some bits
> can be guessed, as it will be pointers to kernel memory) but with
> attacker controlled length.
> 
> Proposed fix thread: 
> http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=133455718001608&w=2
> 
> References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=814278
> 
> Thanks,

Please use CVE-2012-2119 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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