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Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2012 15:47:52 -0400
From: Tom Lane <tgl@...hat.com>
To: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        pgsql-jdbc@...tgresql.org, Steffen Dettmer <steffen@...t.de>
Subject: Re: CVE DISPUTE notification: postgresql-jdbc: SQL injection due improper escaping of JDBC statement parameters 

Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> writes:
> So I think it's safe to say that we can (and should) assign CVE's
> based on the unintended interactions of products (assigning a CVE
> helps ensure that people are more likely to find out, security
> scanners all love to pick up on CVE's, etc.). I'm going to assign a
> CVE for this and suggest a description of (stolen directly from the
> first bug report
> (http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security/2012-03/msg00024.html):

> "When using PostgreSQL JDBC driver version 8.1 to connect to a
> PostgreSQL version 9.1 database, escaping of JDBC statement parameters
> does not work and SQL injection attacks are possible. It should be
> noted that the PostgreSQL JDBC driver version 8.1 is officially
> obsolete and should not be used."

> Please use CVE-2012-1618 for this issue.

Well, if you want to have a CVE for this, you should use a more
complete description.  The actual scenario is that pre-8.2 versions
of the JDBC driver do not know about the "standard_conforming_strings"
option of more recent Postgres servers, and are insecure with *any*
Postgres server in which that option is turned on, which has been
possible since server version 8.2.  What changed in the 9.1 server
is that that option is now on by default.  It's still possible
(and will remain so for the foreseeable future) to turn the option off
in the server configuration, making this and other ancient clients
secure again.  But that isn't the default anymore.

			regards, tom lane

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