Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 09:24:07 -0400 From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@...rtesan.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE for OpenBSD random() bug? > It would seem this fits into the "weaker then advertised" class of > security problem. Thoughts/comments (anyone strongly against this)? Since random(3) is not a cryptographically secure random function I'm not sure that is makes sense to assign a CVE. I suppose it really depends on the likelihood of someone calling srandom(0); I don't know why anyone would do that on purpose. If you must use random(3) instead of something stronger like arc4random(3), it is possible to seed the PRNG via /dev/arandom using srandomdev(3) or set the seed state manually via initstate(3), both of which provide more than just 32 bits of seed data. - todd
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