[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 23:49:32 +0530
From: Zubin Mithra <zubin.mithra@...il.com>
To: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
Cc: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@...e.de>, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
Dhanesh k <dhanesh1428@...il.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-Request taglib vulnerabilities
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:49 PM, Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>wrote:
> On 03/21/2012 09:42 AM, Ludwig Nussel wrote:
> > Zubin Mithra wrote:
> >> [...]
> >> The issues which are present in the latest "release" but not in the
> current
> >> development head were :-
> >>
> >> [3] Lack of sanity checks of fields which were read, and were used for
> >> allocating memory; crafted files would lead of application crash.
> >
> > Not an issue according to upstream:
> > http://mail.kde.org/pipermail/taglib-devel/2012-March/002187.html
>
> Shouldn't it simply say "file to large" or "unable to allocate blah"
> something rather than crashing? I assume by "large" file the file
> doesn't actually need to be large, just the header information needs to
> claim it is large?
>
Yes, the file does not need to be large, it just needs to have a crafted
header.
On investigating the issue further, discussing with a developer Lukas
Laninsky and providing PoC's, we had confirmed that the root issue was an
Integer overflow - which would cause a large allocation and crash the
application.
The changeset that corrects it can be found here =>
https://github.com/taglib/taglib/commit/dcdf4fd954e3213c355746fa15b7480461972308
>
> >> [4] A one bit change in a working ogg file would cause a thread to loop
> >> infinitely.
> >
> > http://mail.kde.org/pipermail/taglib-devel/2012-March/002191.html
> >
> https://github.com/taglib/taglib/commit/b3646a07348ffa276ea41a9dae03ddc63ea6c532
>
> Has this been confirmed? Does the looping thread actually cause a DoS,
> simply slow down the application a bit, or?
>
Yes, it just causes a thread to cause an infinite loop and does not cause
an application crash.
>
> > cu
> > Ludwig
>
>
>
> --
> Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
>
Regards,
Zubin Mithra
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
