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Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2012 22:14:43 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>, crak.otaku@...il.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: tucan insecure plugin update mechanism

On 01/18/2012 07:12 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> Saw a Debian bug report about tucan and how it insecurely handles
> "plugin" updates (which are basically python scripts).  These "plugins"
> are executed with the privileges of the user running tucan, and because
> there is no authenticity checking (plugins are not signed, doesn't look
> like there are any certificate checks when connecting to the update
> server, etc.), it's prone to MITM attacks where an attacker could
> basically run arbitrary code as the user running tucan.
>
> I'm not sure how popular this program is or how widely used, but this is
> definitely not good design.
>
> References:
>
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=656388
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=782999
> http://code.google.com/p/tucan/
>
> (I'm cc'ing who I hope is one of the lead developers, although it
> doesn't look like much development has been done in the last year)
>
Please use CVE-2012-0063 for this issue.

-- 

-- Kurt Seifried / Red Hat Security Response Team

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