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Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2012 12:39:11 +0800
From: Eugene Teo <>
To: Kurt Seifried <>
        "Steven M. Christey" <>
Subject: Re: CVE request: kernel: proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem

On 01/18/2012 10:30 AM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> On 01/17/2012 07:25 PM, Eugene Teo wrote:
>> "Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
>> robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
>> other related files.
>> This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
>> tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
>> simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
>> descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_ VM.
>> That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
>> somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
>> this commit.
>> I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
>> addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
>> actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
>> the offsets for IO would have changed too."
>> Thanks, Eugene
> Please use CVE-2012-0056 for this issue.


Thanks, Eugene

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