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Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2011 09:06:57 +0200
From: Tomas Hoger <thoger@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@...xchg8b.com>, joerg@...bsd.org
Subject: Re: LZW decompression issues

On Thu, 29 Sep 2011 04:38:08 +0400 Solar Designer wrote:

> http://cvsweb.openwall.com/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/Owl/packages/gzip/Attic/gzip-1.3.5-google-owl-bound.diff
> http://cvsweb.openwall.com/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/Owl/packages/gzip/Attic/gzip-1.3.5-gentoo-huft_build-return.diff
> 
> (these are in Attic because we've since updated to gzip 1.4).
> 
> As far as I can see, the sanity checks in
> gzip-1.3.5-google-owl-bound.diff do not overlap with those in FreeBSD's
> latest patch.  These are different sets of checks.

Tavis also reported an issue in ncompress - CVE-2006-1168 - with the
following fix added to ncompress:

http://ncompress.git.sourceforge.net/git/gitweb.cgi?p=ncompress/ncompress;a=commitdiff;h=e21aad4a5a3ba0b6c2279b28a80f85b0b226a175

It's rather closely related to CVE-2011-2895, as it was also creating
prefix loop, via bogus first code.  At the time that was reported, the
case that I originally started to look at (code > free_ent) was already
fixed in ncompress, afaics.

> As to who originally added the "maxbits < 12" check, when, and why
> exactly (and why this value), I still don't know.  In NetBSD, it is
> added with a commit made 6 weeks ago:
> 
> http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/usr.bin/gzip/zuncompress.c?only_with_tag=MAIN
> 
> The commit message is merely "Do proper input validation without
> penalizing performance", and it makes several other changes as well
> (FreeBSD in fact reused essentially the same patch).

The "without penalizing performance" is reference to my original
libXfont one-liner fix that did not prevent loops, only blocked their
impact by checking for stack buffer overflow.  The same kind of fix
Tavis proposed for ncompress to address CVE-2006-1168.

As for < 12, I'm guessing it comes from libXfont too, which had it
before because of this:

    if (maxbits > BITS || maxbits < 12)
	return 0;
    hsize = hsize_table[maxbits - 12];

where:

static int hsize_table[] = {
    5003,	/* 12 bits - 80% occupancy */
    9001,	/* 13 bits - 91% occupancy */
    18013,	/* 14 bits - 91% occupancy */
    35023,	/* 15 bits - 94% occupancy */
    69001	/* 16 bits - 95% occupancy */
};

This seems to be a re-write of the original:

#if BITS == 16
# define HSIZE	69001		/* 95% occupancy */
#endif
#if BITS == 15
# define HSIZE	35023		/* 94% occupancy */
#endif
#if BITS == 14
# define HSIZE	18013		/* 91% occupancy */
#endif
#if BITS == 13
# define HSIZE	9001		/* 91% occupancy */
#endif
#if BITS <= 12
# define HSIZE	5003		/* 80% occupancy */
#endif

The original seems to allow maxbits < 12.

NetBSD / FreeBSD uses following:

#define	BITS		16		/* Default bits. */
#define	HSIZE		69001		/* 95% occupancy */

hence maxbits < 12 is probably not needed for the same reason it's
needed in libXfont.

Anyway, there seems to be an easy way to test.  Can anyone with updated
NetBSD or FreeBSD try this:

  echo test | compress -b 10 | uncompress

?

-- 
Tomas Hoger / Red Hat Security Response Team

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