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Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2011 15:05:33 +0100
From: Ralf Baechle <ralf@...ux-mips.org>
To: Thomas Osterried <thomas@...erried.de>
Cc: Eren Türkay <eren@...dus.org.tr>,
oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
Thomas Osterried <ax25@...erg.in-berlin.de>
Subject: Re: CVE request (and disclosure): ax25d missing
setuid return code check
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 02:13:23PM +0200, Thomas Osterried wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, den 11. August 2011 um 07:20:41 Uhr, schrieb Eren Türkay <eren@...dus.org.tr> in <20110811052041.GB2043@...t-is@...some>:
> > On Tue, Aug 09, 2011 at 11:33:04PM -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> > > The AX.25 daemon (ax25d), typically provided in the ax25-tools
> > > package, allows administrators to associate incoming AX.25, NET/ROM,
> > > and ROSE traffic with the execution of an endpoint program (most
> > > commonly "node"), which is run under a specified user account.
> > > Because ax25d is missing a check on the return code for a setuid call
> > > responsible for dropping privileges to the specified user, it may be
> > > possible to cause setuid to fail, after which the chosen program will
> > > be executed with root privileges. In other words, if you're in the
> > > business of handing out unprivileged shells over amateur radio (don't
> > > we all? :p ), this would allow for remote compromise.
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > Thank you for your investigation on the topic. Although this issue seems
> > to be low-priority, it's good to let the maintainers know.
> >
> > I'm CCing Ralf Baechle, and Thomas Osterried who, accordingly to
> > linux-ac25 site, are the maintainers of ax25 utilities.
>
> thank you for your information.
>
> I know that code fragment, but I never imagined that if root calls
> setuid/setgid that this could fail, because root has by definition enough
> rights.
Welcome to the new world where things are more complicated ...
These days setuid and similar syscalls need to allocate memory for the
credentials of a process and memory allocations may fail. A system could
even be put under massive memory pressure with the intend to make this
allocation fail.
Also setuid requires the capability CAP_SETUID which a process - running
as root or not may not have.
Finally a the Linux security subsystem has its say and while it's odd to
configure an LSM to reject the attempt to drop privileges it's entirely
possible.
Ralf
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