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Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2011 21:21:52 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Security] CVE request: kernel: taskstats/procfs io infoleak
(was: taskstats authorized_keys presence infoleak PoC)
On Wed, Jun 29, 2011 at 17:10 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 29, 2011 at 15:11 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > 2) as you say here:
> >
> > READ = CONST + SENSITIVE + CONTROLLABLE
> >
> > If CONST is known and CONTROLLABLE is controlled by an attacker then he
> > may find C1 and C1+1 generating X kb - 1 and (X+1) kb traffic,
>
> (X+1) kb - 1 and (X+1) kb of course, they are rounded to X and X+1 kbs,
> respectively.
OK, what I've explored:
For the same ssh if try to log and send pubkey/password auth requests:
read = C1 + (C2 + X)*A + C3*B
where 1 <= A+B <= 6, 0 < A, 0 <= B
A - number of pubkey requests
B - number of password requests
C1, C2, C3 - system dependant constants
Trying all possible pairs (A,B) I get a set of rounded read_characters.
Comparing it with generated table of all possible lengthes and possible
inputs (A,B) I learn an interval of possible authorized_keys files
sizes. For my system I can learn privkey length because for all
possible key len values (768, 1024, 2048) the intervals are different.
So, with rounded read_characters value it's possible to learn privkey
length.
Not a password length, but already something.
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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