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Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 16:13:05 -0400
From: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: klibc@...or.com
Subject: Re: [klibc] CVE request: klibc: ipconfig sh script
 with unescaped DHCP options

Might it be worth fixing the insecure temporary file usage?

122         snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "/tmp/net-%s.conf", dev->name);
123         f = fopen(fn, "w");

What if someone else has already created that file, or put a symlink
or hard link there?  What if someone overwrites your string with
command injection characters despite your stripping?

-Dan

On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 4:44 AM, maximilian attems <max@...o.at> wrote:
> Related to CVE-2011-0997
>
> ipconfig vulnerability for malicious dhcpd if $DNSDOMAIN is later
> used unquoted, than proof of concept involves
> DNSDOMAIN="\\\"\$(echo owned; touch /tmp/owned)"
>
> fix:
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=libs/klibc/klibc.git;a=commit;h=46a0f831582629612f0ff9707ad1292887f26bff
> will be part of the just to be released klibc-1.5.22
>
>
> --
> maks
>
> _______________________________________________
> klibc mailing list
> klibc@...or.com
> http://www.zytor.com/mailman/listinfo/klibc
>

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