Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2008 12:06:28 +0200 From: Robert Buchholz <rbu@...too.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: viewvc security flaw? On Friday, 19. September 2008, Josh Bressers wrote: > I'm not sure about this one, I'm wondering if someone else has an > opinion: http://viewvc.tigris.org/issues/show_bug.cgi?id=354 > > It was submitted as a Fedora security update, which I'm letting through > for now, as better safe than sorry. > > To sum it up, it looks like the mime type used to display a given file > in viewvc can be set via the URL. Obviously this means that an attacker > could force an arbitrary mime type on any file in a viewvc repository. > > It strikes me as not crossing a trust boundary though, as I suspect > you'd need something malicious in the repo in order for this to really > be useful. If the bad guys can already add arbitrary content, you have > bigger problems. We also just received this report as upstream announced it as a security issue. Nevertheless, I would follow your argument. A crafted link could at worst case crash the browser. But as far as I can imagine nothing inside the repository can be exploited by changing its mime-type at delivery. Robert [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
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