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Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 17:26:12 +0100
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, coley@...us.mitre.org
Subject: Acrobat Reader 8.1.2 tmp racy wrapper script
Hi,
I wonder if we will ever get rid of tmpraces, but /usr/bin/acroread from
Acrobat Reader 8.1.2 has this gem that shows someone is forgetting the
past again:
MkTemp()
{
if [ "${mktemp_count+set}" != "set" ]; then
mktemp_count="0"
fi
mktemp_file="/tmp/acrobat.$$.${mktemp_count}"
while /usr/bin/test -e "$mktemp_file"
do
mktemp_count="`expr $mktemp_count + 1`"
mktemp_file="/tmp/adobe.$$.${mktemp_count}"
done
touch "$mktemp_file" && chmod 644 "$mktemp_file" && echo "$mktemp_file"
}
called by:
LOGFILE="`MkTemp /tmp/ssl_logXXXXXX`"
CERTNAME="`MkTemp /tmp/certi.cerXXXXXX`"
CERTDATA="`MkTemp /tmp/certDataXXXXXX`"
They seem to have replaced perfectly fine "mktemp" calls by their own unsecure
wrapper again. Just replace it back by "mktemp" and it will work.
No CVE allocated yet. I also have mailed PSIRT @ youknowhere.
Since this code is only run if you start acroread with special options, it is not
that problematic.
Ciao, Marcus
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