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Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 16:18:37 +0200
From: Luca Barbato <lu_zero@...too.org>
To: musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: arc4random/csprng

On 02/07/2018 22:39, Rich Felker wrote:
> I haven't followed what's been happening with posix_random lately, but
> glibc has adding the arc4random interfaces and it seems reasonable
> that we should too, with the easy option to add the posix_random name
> for it and whatever interface details POSIX decides on.
> 
> The glibc implementation looks like it's essentially CTR mode AES.
> This is probably a pretty good choice, but unless there are strong
> reasons not to I'd probably rather go with Hash-DRBG or HMAC-DRBG
> utilizing the existing SHA-256 code we already have. That would avoid
> the need to write or import any new cryptographic code (and the
> associated risks) and keep the size cost minimal. This seems better
> for forward-secrecy too, but I'd like to better understand the
> conditions under which Hash-DRBG and HMAC-DRBG provide
> forward-secrecy.

>From what I read the various BSDs opted for ChaCha20, not sure which are
the trade-offs for this choice thought.

lu

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