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Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 02:10:15 -0800
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: Rich Felker <dalias@...ifal.cx>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
libc-alpha <libc-alpha@...rceware.org>, musl@...ts.openwall.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC] Possible new execveat(2) Linux syscall
On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 01:30:10PM -0500, Rich Felker wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 03:42:15PM +0000, David Drysdale wrote:
> > I'm not familiar with O_EXEC either, I'm afraid, so to be clear -- does
> > O_EXEC mean the permission check is explicitly skipped later, at execute
> > time? In other words, if you open(O_EXEC) an executable then remove the
> > execute bit from the file, does a subsequent fexecve() still work?
>
> Yes. It's just like how read and write permissions work. If you open a
> file for read then remove read permissions, or open it for write then
> remove write permissions, the existing permissions to the open file
> are not lost. Of course open with O_EXEC/O_SEARCH needs to fail if the
> caller does not have +x access to the file/directory at the time of
> open.
Adding a FMODE_EXEC similar to FMODE_READ/WRITE would be trivial.
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