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Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 21:54:32 +0200
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@....com>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
On 6 August 2018 at 21:50, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 12:35 PM, Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote:
>> On 6 August 2018 at 20:49, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Aug 6, 2018 at 10:45 AM, Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com> wrote:
>>>> I guess what I'm getting at is that if the protection mechanism is "always
>>>> return with SP outside TTBR1", there seems little point in going through the
>>>> motions if SP in TTBR0 could still be valid and allow an attack to succeed
>>>> anyway; this is basically just me working through a justification for saying
>>>> the proposed scheme needs "depends on ARM64_PAN || ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN",
>>>> making it that much uglier for v8.0 CPUs...
>>>
>>> I think anyone with v8.0 CPUs interested in this mitigation would also
>>> very much want PAN emulation. If a "depends on" isn't desired, what
>>> about "imply" in the Kconfig?
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but actually, using bit #0 is maybe a better alternative in any
>> case. You can never dereference SP with bit #0 set, regardless of
>> whether the address points to user or kernel space, and my concern
>> about reloading sp from x29 doesn't really make sense, given that x29
>> is always assigned from sp right after pushing x29 and x30 in the
>> function prologue, and sp only gets restored from x29 in the epilogue
>> when there is a stack frame to begin with, in which case we add #1 to
>> sp again before returning from the function.
>
> Fair enough! :)
>
>> The other code gets a lot cleaner as well.
>>
>> So for the return we'll have
>>
>> ldp x29, x30, [sp], #nn
>>>>add sp, sp, #0x1
>> ret
>>
>> and for the function call
>>
>> bl <foo>
>>>>mov x30, sp
>>>>bic sp, x30, #1
>>
>> The restore sequence in entry.s:96 (which has no spare registers) gets
>> much simpler as well:
>>
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>> @@ -95,6 +95,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>> */
>> add sp, sp, x0 // sp' = sp + x0
>> sub x0, sp, x0 // x0' = sp' - x0 = (sp + x0) - x0 = sp
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ROP_SHIELD
>> + tbnz x0, #0, 1f
>> + .subsection 1
>> +1: sub x0, x0, #1
>> + sub sp, sp, #1
>> + b 2f
>> + .previous
>> +2:
>> +#endif
>> tbnz x0, #THREAD_SHIFT, 0f
>> sub x0, sp, x0 // x0'' = sp' - x0' = (sp + x0) - sp = x0
>> sub sp, sp, x0 // sp'' = sp' - x0 = (sp + x0) - x0 = sp
>
> I get slightly concerned about "add" vs "clear bit", but I don't see a
> real way to chain a lot of "add"s to get to avoid the unaligned
> access. Is "or" less efficient than "add"?
>
Yes. The stack pointer is special on arm64, and can only be used with
a limited set of ALU instructions. So orring #1 would involve 'mov
<reg>, sp ; orr sp, <reg>, #1' like in the 'bic' case above, which
requires a scratch register as well.
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