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Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 22:05:53 -0600
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] big key: get rid of stack array allocation
Hi Eric,
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 06:51:39PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 10:29:06PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > We're interested in getting rid of all of the stack allocated arrays in the
> > kernel [1]. This patch removes one in keys by switching to malloc/free.
> > Note that we use kzalloc, to avoid leaking the nonce. I'm not sure this is
> > really necessary, but extra paranoia seems prudent.
> >
> > Manually tested using the program from the add_key man page to trigger
> > big_key.
> >
> > [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>
> > CC: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> > CC: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> > CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> > CC: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
> > ---
> > security/keys/big_key.c | 12 +++++++++---
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
> > index fa728f662a6f..70f9f785c59d 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
> > @@ -108,13 +108,18 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
> > * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
> > * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
> > */
> > - u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)];
> > + u8 *zero_nonce;
> > +
> > + zero_nonce = kzalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!zero_nonce)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> >
> > aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
> > - if (!aead_req)
> > + if (!aead_req) {
> > + kfree(zero_nonce);
> > return -ENOMEM;
> > + }
> >
> > - memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
> > aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
> > aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
> > aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
> > @@ -131,6 +136,7 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
> > error:
> > mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock);
> > aead_request_free(aead_req);
> > + kzfree(zero_nonce);
> > return ret;
>
> A dynamic allocation here doesn't make sense -- the algorithm is hard-coded to
> AES-GCM, so the IV size is fixed. You should just include <crypto/gcm.h> and
> use GCM_AES_IV_LEN. As a sanity check you can add
> 'BUG_ON(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_LEN' to big_key_init().
>
> kzfree() also doesn't make sense since the nonce is not secret information.
Thanks, I've fixed this for v2.
Cheers,
Tycho
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